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Abstract: 
Violence is a regular occurrence at many of Jerusalem’s holy sites. Ongoing 
civilian clashes play a role, but official modes of control through the Israeli 
army (IDF) and Border Police as well as more informal private security 
operations are often involved. Such militarisation may keep violent upheavals 
in check, but it is carried out within the framework of a long and harsh 
occupation. The two sites considered  here  – the Western Wall in the Old City 
and Rachel’s Tomb on the border of Jerusalem and Bethlehem – each have a 
history of war and are fixtures of the occupation. This study explores the 
mechanisms that embed religious and militaristic meanings at each site.  In 
doing so, certain questions are addressed: firstly, how are the sites being 
constructed and used as popular and dramatic settings for certain 
constituents to promote religious militarism/militarised religion in 
Jerusalem? In which ways do these characteristics act to intertwine with the 
religious and militaristic aspects of the sites, making them more extreme but 
also, in some circles, more attractive? And finally, how do these sites 
contribute to the character of Jerusalem, both in their own construction and 
image but also in the roles they play within the wider urban topography?  
 
 
***** 
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In a study of the role of religion in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) today, 
Stuart A Cohen (2000, p. 254) relates a homily from the third century CE. In 
this teaching, the scroll and the sword are presented as having come ‘down 
from Heaven tied together’. God advises the Israelites ‘if you observe the 
torah…which is written in the one, you will be saved from the other; if not, 
you will be smitten by it’. Cohen then goes on to say that in modern Zionist 
thinking, the sword and the scroll have become twinned rather than mutually 
exclusive; both are deemed necessary in order to serve the country (p. 254-55). 
Yet since the first Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in 1987 and the Oslo Accords 
of the early 1990s,1 the rise of religious nationalism in Israel has been dramatic 
in the face of relinquishing land for peace.2 This is especially evident in the 
influence of right-wing, and often extremist, Jewish settler movements on and 
within the Israeli government and military; to good extent religious 
nationalism has moved from the fringes of society to a central position (Zertal 
and Eldar, 2007; Gorenberg, 2000; Feige, 2009; Inbari 2009).  
 
It is once again possible to re-assess the sword and scroll relationship to 
suggest that rather than being equal to or led by armed struggle, religion has 
becoming a primary driving force in Israeli militarism. In reference to the 
dominant settler movements, Feige explains ‘the fusion of the political and 
the religious’ as a ‘religious dictim in the eyes of the believers’ (Feige, 2009, p. 
33). In broader terms, Kimmerling  explains the nation’s shift from a ‘national 
                                                
1 The period of negotiations between Israel and the PLO in the first half of the 
1990s is often referred to as ‘Oslo’.  
2 Kimmerling (1999, p. 342) explains religious nationalism as ‘arriving at  
Zionism from a religious starting point’.  
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security religion’ to a ‘national religious culture’ favouring the creation and 
maintenance of a Greater Israel as derived from biblical ideals (1993, p. 217).3 
It would be wrong to belittle Israel’s emphasis upon security, which still 
dominates most political and military thinking; as an over-riding concept, and 
a threat, it is regularly used to enlist the support of secular Jews and alienate 
Palestinians. But Kimmerling’s emphasis upon a new aggressiveness in the 
name of religion shows the concept to have altered to mean the security of the 
Jewish nation and the biblical Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael). This thinking 
dominates not just the fighting of wars, but it carries with it an ideology that 
permeates the practice of everyday life. As will be argued here, it dominates 
the form and meaning of major Jewish holy places within the urban character 
and spatial structure of Jerusalem.  
 
To fair extent, and in religious circles, national religious Jews have taken the 
upper hand from the ultra-orthodox groups, or haredim. The differences 
between the two are not always distinct, but it is possible to say that generally 
the latter believe in redemption realised in God’s own time and unaffected by 
human interference, whereas for national religious adherents, all of the Land 
of Israel is considered God-given, carrying an obligation for Jews to redeem it 
by human hands. This may be accomplished by violence if necessary, 
regardless of who lives there or has previous claims on the land or ownership 
of property. The difference between the two groups is well summarised by 
the criticism of national religious groups by a haredi rabbi: ‘instead of 
adapting their ideology to Judaism, they wish to adapt Judaism to their 
                                                
3 Kimmerling (1993, p. 208) believes that the place of the IDF and Israel’s 
security always  had a sacred status in a secular sense, but this has changed to 
a clearly religious conviction. 
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ideology’ (Sela, 2007; see also: Kimmerling, 1999, pp.342-43). Along with 
private security and vigilante groups, the extreme factions of national 
religious Judaism advocate the use of state military force to secure and 
redeem the Land (Cohen 2007, p. 5).  
 
As Jewish religion and nationalism have become more interdependent, 
Jerusalem has become central to national religious efforts and the ideology 
Mayer, 2008, p. 240). Within the Land, Jerusalem remains the Holy City; it 
was the site of the Jewish Temple, now destroyed. The major remaining 
physical fragment of the Second (Herod’s) Temple, the Western Wall (Kotel 
ha-Maaravi), has become Judaism’s most sacred place. Other sites in 
Palestinian East Jerusalem have been revived or reinvented as holy places, 
sometimes with little historical or archaeological, basis, and usually to the 
detriment of the Palestinian inhabitants on or near the sites (Pullan et al,  
2013, chs. 2, 7; Emek Shaveh)). The ‘City of David’ in Palestinian Silwan is the 
largest and most prominent, and has been fabricated as a major tourist site 
(Pullan et al, 2013, ch. 4); the Muslim Quarter of the Old City is becoming 
dotted with yeshivas, synagogues and other places of prayer (Pullan et al, 
2013, ch. 7). Several ancient tombs have been venerated traditionally by the 
three monotheistic faiths but taken over exclusively by Jews, having 
experienced a revival in interest by both haredi and settler groups. Rachel’s 
Tomb is one of the most significant of these. Located in Palestinian Jerusalem, 
the tombs are heavily contested and provide focal points for the settlers to 
appropriate adjacent areas of Palestinian property as settlements.  
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Violence is a regular occurrence at many of Jerusalem’s religious sites. 
Ongoing civilian clashes play a role, but official modes of control through the 
IDF and Border Police as well as more informal private security operations 
and informal militias of the settlers are often involved. Such militarisation 
may keep violent upheavals in check, but as it is within the framework of a 
long and harsh occupation, violence forms a subtext that is close to the 
surface and constantly at the point of erupting. The two sites to be considered 
in this article – the Western Wall in the Old City and Rachel’s Tomb at 
Jerusalem’s southern extreme on the edge of Bethlehem – each have a history 
of war and are fixtures in the occupation (figure 1). This article will explore 
how the current religious and militaristic meanings of each site are embedded 
within their physical construction and location. The former is undisputedly 
Judaism’s holiest shrine and the latter has been described as the religion’s 
second or third holiest place (the discrepancy seems to come from self-
appointed guardians). Both sites are dependent upon a combination of 
scriptural narrative and modern historical interpretations for their present 
content and esteem. Yet, today in Jerusalem, the two sites have different 
constituents: the Western Wall is central to the city and the nation and figures 
in the imagination of the secular population, whereas Rachel’s Tomb has 
come to represent a more extreme form of religious radicalism attractive to its 
own dedicated followers but few others. Their geographical locations in 
Jerusalem reflect their status. 
 
I shall restrict my study to the Jewish structuring and controlling of the two 
sites, but always shadowing the Jewish occupation is the legacy of Palestinian 
dispossession. It is both the cause for and the real victim of the conditions I 
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investigate and at both sites, the Palestinian city is physically adjacent and 
visible. But I also suggest that the measures taken at the Jewish sites go 
beyond the need for national security or controlling the Palestinians, and 
instead take on a life of their own, promoting a religious and nationalistic 
image of communal violence that supports the twin goals of retaining the 
land and hastening messianic redemption.  Several key issues repeatedly arise 
and will be explored: firstly, how are the sites being constructed and used as 
popular and dramatic settings for certain constituents to promote religious 
militarism/militarised religion in Jerusalem? How do these characteristics act 
to intertwine with the religious and militaristic aspects of the sites, making 
them more extreme but also, in some circles, more attractive? And finally, 
how do these sites contribute to the character of Jerusalem, both in their own 
construction and image but also in the roles they play within the wider urban 
topography?  
 
This article has developed out of extensive research on the urban aspects of 
Jerusalem and how they relate to the wider Israel-Palestine conflict.4 The 
situation is complex and the findings presented here are intended to illustrate 
aspects of this confusing and often contradictory city although not necessarily 
to clarify it. Despite the various ideological factions that attempt to dominate 
it, Jerusalem is a city that is characterised by ambivalence. My research has 
entailed the monitoring of the two primary sites over time, and although my 
                                                
4 The research for this article forms part of the ESRC Large Grant project, 
‘Conflict in Cities and the Contested State’, undertaken 2007-13 (RES-060-25-
0015 ) and the ESRC-funded ‘Conflict in Cities: Architecture and Urban Order 
in Divided Jerusalem’, 2005-7 (RES-228-25-0056). Historical research on the 
Western Wall and Rachel’s Tomb was begun in the early 1990s. I am grateful 
to Lefkos Kyriacou for drawing the maps for this article and for comments by 
the anonymous reviewers. 
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text refers primarily to their current attributes, my insights have been 
gleaned, at least in part, by many return visits.5 My approach is 
phenomenological; thus description, where place is key to particular 
understandings, may be laborious to read but essential nonetheless.  Rachel’s 
Tomb and the Western Wall have been observed and documented through 
visual research and architectural site work as well as the more standard use of 
interviews and archival investigation.   
 
Violence, militarism, militarisation and security 
In the sites I consider here, militarism may be regarded as a value that 
contributes to particular controls in spatial structures and practices, and that 
incorporates exclusivity beyond their articulation as holy places.  In doing so, 
it is regularly seen to conflict with civilian roles and expectations, may project 
violence, actual or feared, onto the sites, or may become sufficiently absorbed 
in the holy places to emerge as a major feature of them. As security is put into 
the hands of private firms and informal settler groups, and the Israeli 
authorities turn a blind eye, agree to, or even pay for these services (Benn, 
2009; Haaretz Editorial, 2013), there is a fluid and often unclear relationship 
between official and informal policing and this lends a sense of uncertainty to 
the sites. A recent study of policing in Palestinian Jerusalem points out that 
‘policing priorities and objectives in East Jerusalem are directed primarily 
towards the maintenance of public order rather than law enforcement’ 
(Dumper, 2013, p. 1260). These shifting conditions must be seen against a 
system where the absence of written documents is notable (Cohen 2007, p.6; 
Eggen Røislien, 2013, p. 214) and obscure and ad hoc procedures appear to 
                                                
5 In this article, my references to site visits note only my most recent 
encounters with these holy places. 
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intentionally confuse (Pullan, 2013b; Weizman, 2007, p.5). The result is long 
term uncertainty in everyday Palestinian life and the hardening of the 
occupation. 
 
The linking of militarism and violence may seem obvious but raises certain 
questions. The use of the word ‘violence’ as something common within a 
society may be rejected although calling it militarised is acceptable. Catherine 
Lutz points out that in the USA talk of the ‘merits of violence’ is not tolerated 
and the image of ‘soldiers as warrior-killers’ is obscured; nonetheless, war 
preparation is extolled (2002, p. 725). It is sometimes argued that inside a 
militarised culture, control is sufficiently widespread and severe that active 
violence is lessened; certainly it is difficult to know if there would be greater 
incidence of day-to-day violence in Jerusalem without heavy policing. Whilst 
it is not my intention to investigate the possibilities for reducing violence in 
Jerusalem, I am interested in how the combination of messianic religious 
practice and militarisation combine at certain physical locations to foster 
certain meanings that are recognised as violent. This may be so even if the 
hostilities were in the past or are held at bay. I ask what are some of the 
mechanisms in the sites that convey violence and mix it so effectively with 
religion. 
 
With periodic wars, ongoing occupation and an armed forces of well over half 
a million, it is not difficult to regard Israel as a militarised society (Cohen, 
2008, p.1).6 Much has been said about Israel’s obligatory conscription of all 
                                                
6 Out of a total population in Israel of 7,400,000, regular armed forces 
personnel are 176,500, reserves: 445,000, border police: 7,650 (Institute of 
National Security Studies, 2011). 
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Jewish males and females, and the ‘us and them’ feeling engendered in an 
army that uses ethnicity to define its members (among others, Eggen Røislien, 
2013, pp.220-24, passim).7 Opinions are divergent in considering whether Israel 
is a militaristic society, that is, whether militarism is constitutive of its culture 
and society (Cohen, 2008, pp.5-13; Ben-Eliezer, 1998, pp.7-15). Kimmerling 
represents Israeli militarism as a ‘latent state of mind’ (1993, p.200); other 
approaches stress the diversity of the army and Israeli society (Lomsky Feder 
and Ben-Ari, 1999), and some a more nuanced relationship between formal 
and informal procedures (Sheffer and Barak, 2010). Various scholars have 
characterised and defined these terms, but Lutz’s terminology on the 
American military forces and Kimmerling on the IDF make useful 
counterpoints. With respect to militarisation, Lutz characterises it as a process 
‘involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to 
legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their 
leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them’ (2002, p.723). 
She differentiates militarisation from militarism where the latter identifies ‘a 
society's emphasis on martial values (p. 725)’. This echoes Kimmerling’s 
cultural militarism ‘when the armed forces become essential to the social 
experience and collective identity [of a nation]’ (1993, p. 202). But Lutz also 
suggests militarism is where ‘warlike values have an independent ability to 
drive social change’ (2002, p. 725). This point can be taken with Kimmerling’s 
idea that ‘the main expression [of militarism] is a latent state-of-mind’ [my 
italics] (1993, p. 206). The separation of militarism from straightforward 
military practice, so that it becomes embedded in the larger culture to become 
                                                
7 Most Arabs do not serve in the IDF; many haredim are regularly discharged 
from service; youth from a national religious background serve and often 
lead.  
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a latent characteristic, is an important phenomenon that reflects how 
militarism can be absorbed into the urban fabric of Jerusalem through its holy 
places. Whilst militarisation is consciously used by national religious groups 
to facilitate their aims, the city and a broader spectrum of its citizens may 
absorb militarism through more insidious means. 
 
Security in Israel is so ingrained as to be a latent factor of most aspects of life. 
It is not just a matter of military preparedness but a fact of civilian experience. 
Security has been criticised for rendering civil society powerless in the face of 
its hegemony (Barak and Sheffer, 2010, p.19), where ‘”national security” 
resonates much better than “civil liberties”’ (Benn, 2013). In the Israeli 
planning of Jerusalem after the 1967 war, security was cited as the main 
driving force, yet in practice, it became an excuse for separating Israelis and 
Palestinians and for managing the city to suit Israeli needs only (Pullan, 
2013a). The Jewish holy places in East Jerusalem, having become foreign 
enclaves in alien territory, are physically bounded and particularly 
susceptible to stringent security measures; these often develop as a symbiotic 
part of the religious site itself. In fact, it is possible to say that visible security 
enforcement is relied upon to enhance the struggle for and value of some holy 
places. Under certain circumstances security practices are ‘put on show’, and 
at some holy sites in Jerusalem the combination of religious ritual and 
military spectacle can be impressive. With respect to security infrastructure, it 
is important to note that not all is visible, and a tension between what is seen 
and unseen is in some ways analogous to the prominent and the latent of 
militarism.  
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Street violence in Jerusalem – both civilian and military – has a pattern of 
visibility that includes intense and sporadic outbreaks as well as a persistently 
high level of  volatility where hostilities percolate through the urban everyday 
but are often unseen. This underlying violence often makes the visible shows 
of security all the more desirable to Israelis and threatening to Palestinians. 
Certain key sites, like the Western Wall, become authoritative through a 
combination of religious ritual and military procedure. Security is cited as the 
reason for the latter which itself is invoked in order to ensure the former. 
Spatial infrastructures are regularly reinforced and extended, both to make 
them increasingly secure and to appear to be so. Such treatment reflects the 
potential violence that is widely believed to be inherent in the religiosity of 
the site (Hassner, 2009, pp. 2-4, 31-34, passim). 
 
 
The Western Wall as military spectacle 
Since 1967 when Israel conquered Jordanian Jerusalem and gained for itself 
the Western Wall, it has become increasingly common to hold swearing-in  
ceremonies (tekes hashba’ah) for new soldiers joining certain units of the Israel 
Defence Forces.8 Sites that resonate with the national aspirations of the Jewish 
people are favoured for such oaths of allegiance, but the Western Wall is 
primarily a holy place and its use questions the extent to which national 
institutions might be encroaching on religious sites, or vice versa (Horowitz 
and Lissak, 1989, p.140).9 Particularly the paratroopers brigade is associated 
                                                
8 The website of the Western Wall Heritage Foundation reported a recent 
increase from 15 ceremonies in 2008 to 30 in 2012.   
9 It is well accepted that there is a strong religious dimension to the IDF. 
National sites for swearing-in ceremonies include the locations of major 
battles in 1967 such as Latroun and Ammunition Hill, and Masada, an ancient 
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with the Wall, having ‘liberated’ it in the 1967 War; but the site has become 
allied more generally with the IDF, and the image of soldiers there is iconic in 
Israel (Semmerling, 2004, pp.37-42). In replacing what was perceived as old-
fashioned religious observance, fit young troops represent the fighting force 
required to maintain a Jewish state. On the other hand, national ceremonies at 
the Wall have become more religious over time: in the swearing-in 
ceremonies, sermons, prayers and spiritual songs augment what once was 
simple and ‘war-oriented’ (Press, 2010, pp.5-6), female soldier choirs are no 
longer permitted to sing (Saragusti, 2013), and male and female soldiers who 
normally serve together are separated for the purpose of induction 
(Nachshoni, 2013). These changes may be equated with the dominance of the 
national-religious factions and to some extent their integration with more 
traditional groups (Press, 2010); at the same time, the ultra-orthodox 
institutions like the Chief Rabbi’s Office remain powerful. Secular Israelis 
tend not to be involved, yet resist the increased religiosity at what they see as 
primarily a national site.  
 
The swearing-in ceremony is a festive occasion, attended by family and 
friends who enjoy it as a day-out in Jerusalem and a chance to picnic in the 
Western Wall Plaza; however, the main purpose of their visit is to witness the 
new soldiers in their first formal role.10 Unsurprisingly state and military 
insignias and flags are prominently displayed; religious symbols are already 
                                                                                                                                      
fortified mountaintop south of Jerusalem, the site of a mass suicide of Jewish 
rebels against the Roman army in CE73 (Ben-Yehuda, 1995, ch.7).  
10 The ceremonies vary somewhat according to the traditions of the particular 
unit of the IDF. My observations of the families and anonymous interviews 
with them are taken from the dress rehearsal and swearing-in ceremony of 
the anti-aircraft training base of the IDF Air Force, (Conflict in Cities, 
interviews, 2011). 
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in place. Many of the events are held at night, and with floodlights, bunting, 
marching, drum-rolls, and the monumentality of the Wall as backdrop, it is a 
dramatic spectacle (figure 2). Perhaps the most potent symbol of the union of 
religion and military is the presentation of each soldier with a Hebrew Bible 
(tanakh) and a gun. The procedures vary slightly between different IDF units; 
the paratroopers insert the Bible under the recruit’s shirt next to his heart and 
then present the weapon. At the Air Force’s anti-aircraft training ceremony, 
the Bibles are placed on wheeled trolleys covered with embroidered velvet, 
similar to the sort often crafted to cover Torah scrolls in a synagogue; the 
guns are propped up in rows along the side (figure 3).  
 
The ritual enlists each individual to join the collective and together they 
symbolise the soldier’s new bond to the mother country and its fighting force; 
both are not simply Israeli but Jewish (Eggen Røislien, 2013, p.220). It is a 
complicated relationship, well beyond the scope of this article, but it is worth 
noting that recently cracks in this model of allegiance have appeared where 
some soldiers coming from national-religious backgrounds resist the 
perceived role of the army in maintaining national consensus; they claim that 
their primary ‘loyalty is to God’ (Press, 2010). The juxtaposition of the two 
fundamentals of faith and military has, to good extent, been absorbed into 
Israeli public life. At a swearing-in ceremony, the mother of a soldier in one 
self-declared secular family commented that that the gun will be more useful 
to her son than the Bible, but she sees no problem with the combination 
(Conflict in Cities interviews, 2011). Weapons are not unusual in Israeli public 
places and are present at the Wall in other events: participants in bar mitzvah 
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ceremonies can be seen to wrap the leather bindings of phylacteries on one 
arm and a gun strap on the other (figure 4).  
 
Activity at the Western Wall follows the cycles of the Jewish religious year: 
organised prayer takes place each Sabbath, on religious holidays and for bar 
mitzvahs; but at any time of the day or night worshippers may be found there 
for more spontaneous individual prayer. For Jewish religious life, it is the 
main focus - for the city, for the country, and for the diaspora. At the same 
time, this holy place is controversial and contested, not only for having been 
conquered in war, but also because, as well as a remaining wall of the Second 
Temple, it is part of the retaining wall of the Islamic compound known as al-
Haram al-Sharif. For many years before 1967, Jewish worship took place 
along a narrow passage in front of the Wall. Within days after the 1967 War, 
the Israeli authorities demolished the Palestinian Magharib Quarter that stood 
in front of the Wall in order to create the large open plaza that stands there 
today and accommodates large numbers of people who flock there, including 
the pious, tourists, and the merely curious. Jewish religious institutions line 
the Western Wall Plaza and it has been developed to become not only a 
religious compound but an official manifestation of State. Hence, two major 
compounds – Jewish and Islamic – are poised in opposition, each on each 
other’s ruins, tightly juxtaposed and entwined, in the centre of Jerusalem’s 
Old City.  
 
From many places in the Western Wall Plaza, the domes of the Muslim Dome 
of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque are easily visible on the Haram. This is 
particularly true in the theatrical setting of the IDF’s swearing-in ceremony: 
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the focus of Israeli belligerence and fear stands just beyond the Wall (figure 
2). This borderland has seen many violent clashes: the excavation of a tunnel 
resulted in riots and many deaths; proposed Israeli renovations to the ramp to 
the Muslim al-Buraq Gate caused heavy unrest; Ariel Sharon’s visit to the 
Haram via this gate in 2000 set off the Second Intifada, to name only a few. 
Many of these events took places at the juncture between religious belief and 
national security. The site is stoked with a hostile past; it is one of the most 
contested and potentially ferocious places in the world. For young recruits, 
the spatial setting dramatically and emotionally reinforces what they already 
know: the national security discourse is being ratcheted upwards by religious 
fervour. This is palpably evident as they are formally inducted into that 
particular violent world. 
 
The fortress Tomb of Rachel 
If the Bible and gun ceremonies at the Western Wall capitalise on long-
embedded violence right at Jerusalem’s centre, militarism has also become 
entrenched at a location on Jerusalem’s periphery. For many years, Rachel’s 
Tomb (Hebrew: Kever Rahel; Arabic: Qubeh Rahil, also known as Bilal ibn 
Rabah Mosque) was a sleepy Ottoman structure on the road between 
Jerusalem and Bethlehem, traditionally believed by the three monotheistic 
religions to be the burial site of the biblical matriarch Rachel (Strickert, 2007; 
Selwyn, 2009). Through most of its history, members of these faiths 
cooperated in the use of the site (Selwyn, 2009, p.43), although Cust (1980, 
pp.46-48) describes some friction during the British Mandate when Jews held 
the keys to the shrine and the structure was surrounded by a Muslim 
cemetery. Following biblical passages that describe Rachel’s dedication to her 
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children and her death in childbirth on the road,11 the tomb has been a 
favourite place of veneration by women.  
 
Since 1967 the structure has been in Jewish hands and has suffered periodic 
episodes of heavy violence, especially during the two intifadas (Hassner, 
2009, pp.115-16; Selwyn 2009, p.43). In 2005, it was declared unilaterally by 
Israel as part of Jerusalem, and today the site stands in a no-man’s land 
between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, not just on but in the border between 
Israel and Palestine (figures 1, 5). In legal terms its location is heavily 
contested; it was to have been returned to Palestine under the Oslo 
agreements but in 1995, under pressure from settlers and religious groups, 
Israel decided to retain it. Since then this important Jewish holy place has 
been made into a high-profile national religious shrine, referred to by its 
devotees as either the second or third holiest place in Judaism. The 
uncertainty about its status stems from different competing interest groups, 
but the ranking also indicates a recently revived and politically motivated 
place in the Jewish pantheon. The site’s religious status and political value 
have resulted in extraordinary defensive measures being adopted. Today, the 
Tomb is completely enveloped by the concrete separation barrier12 making it 
available to Israeli Jews and tourists coming from Jerusalem in approved 
vehicles, but inaccessible to Palestinians. It has become a military zone, 
literally an urban fortress (figure  6).   
 
                                                
11 ‘So Rachel died and was buried on the way to Ephrath (that is, Bethlehem), 
and Jacob set up a pillar upon her grave; it is the pillar of Rachel’s tomb, 
which is there to this day (Genesis 35.19-20).   
12 The wall, built by Israel on Palestinian land to enclose its own settlements 
and segregate much of the Palestinian population from Israel.  For the sake of 
clarity, I capitalise the Western Wall and not the separation barrier or wall. 
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The extreme conditions of Rachel’s Tomb require further description. The 
sense of isolation, fortification and religiosity begins in the centre of 
Jerusalem. A city bus, advertised since 2009 as no longer needing bullet-proof 
glass, makes its way from the Central Bus Station and haredi neighbourhoods. 
The vehicle is filled mostly with religious women, heads covered, making 
good use of the journey to whisper psalms in the silence that pervades the 
inside of the vehicle; new passengers are invited to buy printed copies of the 
prayers.13 An Israeli soldier checks passports before the bus enters into a 
corridor within the separation barrier, leading to the fortified enclosure. This 
walled umbilical cord is all that connects the shrine to Israel; otherwise the 
Tomb is embedded in the edge of a sprawling Bethlehem, enveloped in the 
separation barrier, and adjacent to Palestinian Aida Refugee Camp on the 
other side of the wall (figures 5, 7). Most of the enclosed site is open, named  
‘Our Mother Rachel Square’, apparently an attempt to normalise it and bring 
it into the urban domain. The tiny tomb structure is hidden behind a long 
stone portico with guard towers on either end. The dominant impression is of 
a modern-day bastion, or a high-security prison, so grimly and so thoroughly 
is it severed from it surroundings. Steel security gates, barbed wire, watch-
towers, police barriers, floodlights and surveillance cameras punctuate the 
wall. Armed military personnel are well in evidence and there is a strong 
sense of a joint endeavour between the faithful and the military, a relationship 
supported by the Tomb websites (Rachel’s Tomb Institute; Rachel’s Tomb 
Committee). Army insignias are proudly displayed on the sites. 
 
                                                
13 Most recently visited 6.1.13. 
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The passengers from the bus stream into the complex to pray (figure 8). The 
tomb room is divided diagonally by a wall that separates male and female 
worshippers. The tomb structure itself is covered in embroidered velvet (like 
the Bible and gun trolley at the Western Wall); on one side is an embroidered 
image of the tomb and on the other the Temple of Jerusalem, a clear reference 
between the outlying site and its larger, more mainstream counterpart in the 
centre of Jerusalem (figure  9). Although festivals are celebrated and regular 
religious lessons take place, connected to the settler-established yeshiva on 
the site, much of the prayer at the Tomb is personal. Individual supplication 
and lamentation takes place in the shadow of Rachel who, as the worshippers 
believe, died on her journey in a place undefined and belonging to no one. Its 
new location within the confines of the separation barrier continue to relegate 
it to no-place between two embattled cities; yet this no-place is also highly 
coveted by each embattled nation. For Palestinians the site is on the edge of a 
refugee camp, part of  a Bethlehem suburb that no longer exists (Selwyn, 2009, 
pp. 44-45); for many Israelis, it is beyond the pale, in dangerous or forbidden 
territory, and not part of the Jerusalem constellation. It is a fortress shrine in a 
frontier zone.  
 
Various Jewish groups use and exert control on this site. Haredim, especially  
mizrahim (orthodox Jews of eastern or oriental origin), traditionally make 
pilgrimage to the Tomb, as is typical of many holy tombs in Israel. The more 
militant settlers pray there, but also see it as an inroad into the Palestinian 
territories of Bethlehem. Moreover, in turning to biblical tradition for 
legitimisation, religious-nationalist camps are happy to exploit Rachel as 
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Mother of the Hebrew nation and modern day Israel (Feige, 2009, pp.222-24).14 
Selwyn’s observation that the settlers and mizrahim  are brought together at 
the Tomb remains true (2009, p.49), yet, as at the Western Wall, the settlers are 
in the ascendant, and able to capitalise on the inherent religious meanings of 
Rachel’s burial place along with the increased militarisation that arises from 
their incursions. Newman (2012) describes the crowds who venerate the 
Tomb on the anniversary of Rachel’s death simply as ultra-orthodox and 
points out that this population no longer is considered moderate with respect 
to the Palestinians and the occupied territories. The sense of an enemy at the 
gates of Jerusalem is a powerful one for many of the devotees of Rachel’s 
Tomb. And as at the Western Wall, the view to Palestine – in this case houses 
and a mosque over the defensive wall – shows it to them clearly (figure  7). 
 
In Our Mother Rachel Square, a garden with a mural of a small domed tomb, 
itself in a pastoral landscape, depicts the structure as it was under the 
Ottomans (figure 10). The image is used widely, on models, children’s toys, 
charity boxes, even tombstones; but the immediacy of the image displayed 
here in the fortress site triggers a progression from romantic memory to its  
complete encasement by military concrete, encouraging visitors to mourn an 
elusive and obliterated past. At the same time, reinventing the Tomb as a 
fortress also legitimises the new settler-led cause that barricades them into a 
site of their own invention. Effectively, they are trapped by their own state of 
siege. 
                                                
14 Biblical and rabbinical passages are painted at the site on the mural of the 
Ottoman tomb: ‘Restrain your voice from weeping and your eyes from tears, 
for there is reward for you accomplishment…your children will return home‘ 
(Jeremiah 31.14-16); And G-D said: Rachel, for you I will return your children 
to their homeland’ (Midrash Eicha Rabba) 
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In attempting to attract visitors, the Committee for Rachel’s Tomb states: 
 
The trip to and from the Tomb is safe. The Israeli Border Patrol and 
Israel Defense Forces keep a continuous watchful eye over the entire 
area. The Tomb is within an enclave or compound that is surrounded 
by 20 foot high concrete walls for your protection. The Tomb has 
undergone massive exterior reinforcement and is a fortress in itself, yet 
the facade of the building has been tastefully and esthetically finished. 
 
The aesthetic qualities are debatable, and as much as they are present, tend to 
fall in line with the severe brutalism of conflict infrastructures. There is little 
doubt that the combination of militarism and piety is effective, expressed in 
the orchestration of the site, in the timed entries of buses through the walled 
corridor, and the disgorging of visitors into a compound that has all of the 
fixtures of the frontier. Although not as splendid as the ceremonies at the 
Western Wall, there is an element of spectacle here, partly facilitated by the 
backdrop of huge military walls and towers.  During Jewish festivals, 
thousands of people flood the site. And occasionally other groups enter into 
the heavy military choreography: on Orthodox Christmas, the steel gates at 
either end were opened and the Christian dignitaries of Bethlehem were 
escorted in a convoy of taxis by the Israeli army on their way to Jerusalem’s 
Old City.15   
 
                                                
15 Observed Christmas Eve, 6.1.13. 
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Some architecture is designed to instil both power and fear (Ellin, 1997, pp.13-
46; Virilio, 1986, pp.12-13, passim; Virilio, 2005). The militarised treatment of 
the Tomb enclosure purports to provide security, but the extreme qualities of 
the site and its architecture also convey anxiety in the very people it protects. 
The treatment of the compound immediately recalls the violent episodes that 
have plagued this site.  Glimpses of Palestinian Bethlehem over the walls 
remind people to be afraid, and in doing so, such treatment helps to make a 
malleable audience. In the language that has become common to many, the 
Tomb is portrayed as an anti-terrorist outpost; Rachel’s Tomb Committee 
(2005) calls it ‘the fortress complex which is used to protect visitors from 
terrorists’ (see also: Baranowski). With this sort of perception, Rachel’s Tomb 
is no longer simply a militarised site for defence, but it becomes part of a 
wider militarism that is rooted in an all powerful threat that demands 
constant vigilance. Many small acts at the site reinforce this idea; one that 
particularly stands out: the wedding dress of a young woman who was killed 
in a terrorist attack in Jerusalem one day before her marriage was re-sewn 
and donated by her mother as a Torah curtain for Rachel’s Tomb.16  Thus, 
while the fortress may be justified as protection to quell the fears of pilgrims, 
its unremitting militarism supports and even vindicates the settlers in their 
increasing domination of the Tomb.  
 
But one major commemoration event has come to dominate the Tomb in 
recent years, reflecting radical changes in Israeli ideology. The anniversary of 
Rachel’s death falls at about the same time as that of the assassinated Israeli 
                                                
16 This act was widely reported in the Jewish press after the 2003 suicide 
bombing and still resonates today (see for example: Ginsburg, 2013).  
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Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.17 Religious-nationalists do not observe the 
annual remembrance for Rabin; feeling that they have been blamed for his 
murder,18 they assert their rejection of the Tel Aviv ceremony by congregating 
instead at Rachels’ Tomb (Newman, 2012). In 2012, approximately 20,000 
people attended Rabin’s memorial but 70,000 visitors were reported at 
Rachel’s Tomb over a 24 hour period (Newman, 2012). Most religious 
nationalists particularly abhorred Rabin’s championing of the Oslo Accords, 
which would have exchanged land for peace. As stated by the Rachel’s Tomb 
Committee, they interpreted this to mean that the Prime Minister and his 
supporters made the agreement with the expectation of a ‘secular-messianic 
era of peace’ (Baranowski). Positing a state agreement in eschatological 
language not only regards the political secular in religious terms, it also 
thrusts the process into a new temporal framework based on eternity rather 
than history (Pullan et al, 2013). As such, it demonstrates the chasm between 
the two ways of thinking (Gorenberg, 2000; Sprinzak, 1991; Inbari, 2009).  
 
The replacement of Rabin by Rachel offers further insights: in national 
religious terms, Rabin is seen as a false martyr and must be replaced by 
Rachel, who wept for her children and the nation and died in the violence of 
childbirth, and so became truly sacrificed. So powerful has the symbolism 
become that whenever a female settler has been murdered, Matriarch Rachel 
is invoked (Feige, 2009, p.227). As much as the swearing-in ceremonies at the 
Western Wall convey a powerful form of male dedication and impending 
bloodshed, the Tomb represents a long history of female devotion laced with 
                                                
17 Dates according to the Jewish calendar do not exactly correspond to the 
Gregorian calendar. 
18 The assassin came from the national religious movements. 
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tragic episodes. The violence of the Tomb site – its isolation, its defences, its 
severe presence – heightens that sense of victimhood and necessary sacrifice 
already endorsed in memory of Mother Rachel.  
 
The Western Wall as site of sacrifice  
In Israel the 1967 conquest of the Western Wall is usually portrayed as the 
return of Judaism’s holiest shrine to its national home, making the place itself 
symbolic of power and victory. In the tradition of Girard’s (1977) important 
formulation of the interconnection and ambivalence of violence and sacrality, 
sacrifice can be seen to underlie this triumph and it is consistently present in 
both sacred history and current practice at the Wall. Two examples are worth 
relating here. The Binding of Isaac at Mount Moriah (Genesis 22.1-14) in 
Jewish belief is traditionally located at the Temple Mount and indicates 
Abraham’s willingness to slaughter his son in deference to God’s will. From 
this combination of faith and violence, Abraham’s descendents are seen to 
form a blessed nation that in victory will ‘possess the gate of their enemies’ 
(Genesis 22.15-18).19 As at Rachel’s tomb, this foundational narrative renders 
all of the nation’s children from the same biblical sources and embeds them at 
that particular site (Feige, 2009, p.227).  
 
In 1967 the national narrative once again demanded violent sacrifice at the 
Wall. This time it was captured in a photograph when a local cameraman 
called David Rubinger snapped three young paratroopers suddenly 
confronted with their own collective history at the ancient site of the Temple. 
                                                
19 In Islamic tradition a similar story is related, however Abraham’s (Arabic: 
Ibrahim) son is not Isaac but Ismail, from whom Muslims are believed to have 
descended. 
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Arriving in the midst of battle, the dazed and exhausted soldiers gaze heaven-
ward in silent awe, each like a modern Isaac at Moriah saved from the 
slaughter, at least momentarily. The photo is an interlude, one that conveys 
the violence that immediately preceded it and was still to follow.20 It was 
officially distributed by the Israeli Government Press Office and immediately 
became an icon of the war. The image is still regularly presented as a living 
myth; in the tourist shops of the Jewish Quarter posters of it are displayed 
next to romantic reprints of Eretz Israel from the 1920s, with the implication 
that the old dream of a nation has been realised by the events of 1967 (figure 
11).  
 
In many armies, sacrifice is lauded as a secular virtue that epitomises how the 
individual participates collectively to represent and secure the nation. But in 
some cases it may be more explicitly religious in reference and may be 
interpreted in fundamentalist terms (Denton-Borhaug, 2011). As far as Israel 
is concerned, sacrifice’s roots in religion informs military language and 
ideology and the call for national security increasingly entails sacrifice and 
heroism based on religious motives (Furman, 1999, p..163). The 
sacrifice/security rationale justifies the underlying violence that characterises 
the defence of the nation. This is presented in the IDF swearing-ceremonies as 
a collective endeavour, one that, through its combination of both military and 
religious ideals, accommodates the various interpretations of collectivity. 
Although he refers to paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, Feldman’s idea of 
sacrificial violence in the name of the collective works in a similar way, 
                                                
20 Rubinger claims to have arrived 15 minutes after the Wall was taken. He laid 
down on the pavement to catch the shot, hence the upward stare of the 
soldiers (Rubinger with Corman, 2007, p.123). 
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providing it, the collective, with certain desired and controllable meanings. 
He states:  
 
…sacrificial violence creates generic subjects as raw material 
vulnerable to labile objectification, for the process of sacrifice requires 
actors who can assume multiple collective meanings and absorb and 
reflect back diverse and often contradictory collective fantasies (2003, 
p.68).  
 
To describe the collective understanding of the swearing-in ceremonies as 
‘fantasies’ may be considered objectionable; nonetheless, it would be fair to 
say that, as at Rachel’s Tomb, biblical narratives have accrued sufficient 
flexibility to be moulded to fit an impending situation or the aspirations of a 
particular segment of the population or an event. The Bible and gun 
ceremonies are emotional national events that offer a powerful venue for the 
absorption and reflection, and more recently, revision, of meaning. Perhaps 
one of the most explicit indications of this was in the choice of the swearing-in 
ceremony at the Wall to declare ‘loyalty to God’ above the IDF, as noted 
above (Press, 2010). 
 
In the years since 1967, religious or quasi-religious experience in support of 
military action has been developed as a central part of visitors’ centres 
established by the Western Wall Heritage Foundation21 in a series of 
underground caverns just north of the Wall. The Chain of Generations is a 
particularly explicit example. Through a dramatic rendering in sound and 
                                                
21 Originally a settler organisation now managed directly by the Prime 
Minister’s office (Greenberg, 2009, p.274).  
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light, the Center presents a history of the Jewish people ‘from the time of the 
Patriarchs until the present’ (Kotel). Elsewhere I have commented in detail on 
the staging of the underground chambers so that biblical history and 
revelation are manipulated to combine seamlessly with increasing 
militarisation in contemporary Israel (Pullan et al, 2013, ch.2). Here I wish to 
return only to two points in the organised tour:22 firstly, its culmination, in the 
presentation of the Paratrooper’s Story of the 1967 taking of the Wall 
(Amirav). From his hospital bed, a wounded soldier relates the story of Rabbi 
Halevi, a victim of the Nazi genocide whose ‘entire life was a song of 
yearning for Jerusalem’ but was prevented from attaining it (Amirav). The 
soldier’s own attachment to the Wall is realised in its capture and his own 
encounter with it as a wounded combatant in the middle of battle. He ‘feels 
that he represents the Jewish people over the generations, and that Jews from 
previous generations are fighting alongside of him’ (Amirav). In carrying on 
the practice of sacrifice, the soldier gives agency to those who had none, and 
ultimately the Wall becomes the sacrificial gift. At the end of the tour, 
immediately after this story, the visitors are spewed out of the Center to 
confront the Wall themselves. The second point I wish to draw on takes place 
a little earlier in the visit. In the ‘State of Israel’ chamber visitors are told that 
they must stand together to build a country that is not yet finished; the 
assumption seems to be that everyone on the tour is Jewish or else supports 
Israel. Whether future nation building means further territorial expansion is 
not stated, but the allusion to the threat of ongoing wars and future hostilities 
is very clear indeed. In other words, future sacrificial acts will be required.  
 
                                                
22 Visited 30.5.11, 17.1.13. Admission is possible only on an organised tour. 
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Conclusion: Violence and the urban topography  
In both the locations considered in this study, violence dominates primary 
religious traditions and quasi religious myths. These meanings are well 
embedded in the physical sites, and although they are largely based in  
collective memories or histories, there is a strong sense of further violence to 
be experienced in the future. Modern military intervention is reinforced by 
the potency of the sites, and reciprocally, the military content offers the holy 
places continuing legitimacy and endurance in a secularised world. The 
hermeneutic circle is completed by the role of sacrifice that emerges from both 
religious beliefs and military expectations and their exigencies. Sacrifice 
reinforces the collective, which is demanded of both religion and the military, 
and in the name of the nation, it is regarded as the justification for violence.  
 
At the sites, various structures and mechanisms arise from popular tradition 
or are purposefully used. Victimisation is incorporated to reinforce the virtues 
of sacrifice. An architecture combining both defence and fear enhances the 
victimisation scenario to reinforce the need for sacrifice. Varying use of 
spectacle and drama adds to the emotional values of the sites and this helps to 
convey the need for the collective and for sacrifice. The sites are commanding 
and well-controlled by both military and religious authorities but at the same 
time they also have a fluidity that, within certain boundaries, accommodates 
changing relationships of nation and religion. What continues to unite both  
sites in the ways that they are understood and used is a broad-brush threat of 
war, and even more so, of terrorism. It is a fear that affects both secular and 
religious Israelis and is absorbed into collective memories and experience that 
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exist deep within the Western Wall and Rachel’s Tomb. But the presentation 
of the threat allows virtually no engagement with the present realities of the 
occupation, even though the Palestinians go about their daily lives just 
beyond the borders of the two sites. 
 
Rachel’s Tomb and the Western Wall represent very different parts of 
Jerusalem. One is a fortress at the periphery of the city, embodying the radical 
conditions of that frontier. The population that uses it reflects its extreme 
position in their own political and religious beliefs. The Western Wall, on the 
other hand, is in the centre of the historic quarter of Jerusalem, on a well-
recognised and venerable site that represents the nation. It attracts a broad 
cross-section of the population, including secular Israelis. To some extent it is 
possible to say that the two sites act in tandem with the overall spatial 
structure of the city, being formed by the urban centre and periphery and 
underpinning these qualities by their own differing characteristics. But what 
they reinforce is an embattled city, and neither aid in developing its viability 
for all of its inhabitants. Furthermore, each site exhibits a worrying 
qualification that emerges out of its own capacity for exclusivity and 
incorporation of heavy violence. On the far edge of the city, Rachel’s Tomb 
has a marginal status today. However, we appear to be witnessing a site that 
is being groomed by national religious interests in order to enhance its 
significance in the national pantheon of holy places. At the moment its 
beleaguered status and harsh demeanour suit this aim; its place on the 
frontier emphasises the settlers’ struggle. However, the settlers’ goals are long 
term: today the Tomb exists only because of the protection of the IDF; in 
future the settlers wish and expect it to become part of a wider West Bank 
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strategy that will integrate Rachel’s Tomb into a more extensive area of Jewish 
settlement. Rachel’s Tomb Committee (Baranowski) states: ‘new threats will 
always on the horizon until the government gives the word and for the IDF to 
retake Bethlehem forever.  Until that time, Rachel's Tomb will be at risk’. No 
longer an extreme frontier, they see it in a more central urban position. This 
does not bode well for indigenous rights in this overwhelmingly Palestinian 
territory. 
 
The military ceremonies at the Western Wall are well-accepted among most 
Israelis in what is regarded as a well-defined compound next to the Jewish 
Quarter. But here as well, much of the Old City is Palestinian, and settlers are 
hard at work in appropriating property in the Christian and Muslim  
Quarters. Much of this is very acrimonious and leads to regular clashes. 
Militarisation is certainly not restricted to the Western Wall Plaza, and with 
increasing national religious representation in the IDF there are greater 
numbers of soldiers that support settler aims. At the instigation of the settler 
organisation Ateret Cohanim, paratrooper groups now march in the Old City, 
particularly focusing on the Muslim Quarter (Zitun, 2012). Besides being 
highly provocative in themselves, the memories of the city’s capture in 1967 
are easily re-enacted in these marches.  They have been transferred from a 
symbolic ceremony in the Western Wall Plaza to intrude deeply into 
Palestinian neighbourhoods. The mimetic quality adds to what is already 
divisive, and increases the build-up of a frontier in the centre of the most 
historic quarters of Jerusalem. The combination of military zeal and religious 
radicalisation in the centre of Jerusalem make it particularly dangerous, even 
more so than at the periphery (Pullan, 2011). 
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